The Republic of Tajikistan
The northern region of Tajikistan, Khujand (Leninabad province), is regarded as an area of Uzbek settlement. The north, as an agricultural and industrial region, is the most developed part of the country, and the people of the region, known as the Khujandis, are in the administrative cadre as holdovers from the former communist period. For this reason the southern group sets itself against the north as a region close to Uzbekistan. In Kulob province in the south, in the Kurgan-Tyube region, and especially in the capital Dushanbe, we can see Uzbeks living dispersed. Those living close to the Afghan border are generally identified as Kulobis. In mountainous Badakhshan, apart from a small number of Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Pamiris are found. The majority of the Pamiris, who regard themselves as distinct from the Sunni Tajiks and even use a separate dialect, are identified as Ismailis. Since the country is divided into three by its high mountains, relations between the regions are not very strong. Because of economic problems, regionalism or tribalism is quite strong. For this reason the government–opposition struggle that began before independence is in an extremely confused state, and in particular the drug and arms smuggling that began in the south, on the Afghan border, together with the desire of mafia-minded groups to keep the trade sectors in their hands, has caused the internal conflicts to deepen further. It is known that these groups, taking advantage of the civil war in Tajikistan, transport the opium poppy and cannabis obtained from the mountainous region via Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Russia, and even to Turkey and the West.
In the years when the government–opposition debates remained inconclusive, the internal turmoil that grew under the influence of Uzbekistan and Russia has today reached dangerous proportions not only for Tajikistan but also for the neighboring countries. The fact that the united opposition forces, which had been removed from power through the influence of the Khujand group, which worked with the government for a certain time, and especially of the Tashkent–Moscow administration, are now preparing, as a result of the armed success they have achieved over a long period, to share the Dushanbe administration with the present government, is regarded as a new beginning for both Russia and Uzbekistan. The opposition, which includes Uzbek, Tajik, Pamiri and other communities, will both have a negative effect on Russia, as happened in Chechnya, and force the Karimov government in Uzbekistan, which is opposed to it, to change its policy.
Indeed, after the assassination attempt on President Rahmonov, who represents the southerners, the local administration blames the group of former Prime Minister Abdullajanov, who represents the Khujand group and was not admitted to the government–opposition talks. There are claims that the activities which Abdullajanov, who was defeated by President Nabiev in the previous elections, has for some time been conducting against the government are supported by the Tashkent government. The Tajik government, for its part, regards these activities of the northerners as the influence of Uzbekistan and is unwilling to admit the Khujand group to the negotiations.
The opposition, which continues its efforts for a government of national unity, has stated its wish that the Khujandi Abdullajanov group, which supports the old conception of the state, be admitted to future meetings, even though it does not like this group. But the failed assassination attempt against the president not only did not allow this; the successive events that have broken out also threaten to rekindle the North–South conflict.
Although we may generally define the events experienced in Tajikistan after independence as regionalism, we must take the economic conditions into account. If foreign powers are not to dominate the region, the neighboring countries must first be made to consider that Tajikistan has an important place in Central Asian peace. In particular, time is running out for the Uzbek leaders to show more understanding on this matter and to make it clear that a possible change of government in Tajikistan will not affect Tashkent. If the Uzbek state, by accepting democratic developments internally, turns towards political reforms, this will both ease the tension in the region and open the way for the groups that embrace Central Asian unity in a broader sense to work more effectively among the people, and finally, around the idea of regional cooperation, the Uzbek–Tajik dispute will gradually dissolve.
