When the Army received the order from the General Staff that an armistice had been concluded, effective from the afternoon of 31 October 1918, it welcomed the news with relief, since it had been under heavy British pressure. The Army believed that, with the armistice signed, the British would suspend their military operations and would not attempt to cross the line held by the 6th Army. The armistice order made it possible to halt the withdrawal that had begun towards Zakho; the second echelon of the headquarters and some rear service units that had been sent back from Mosul towards Zakho were brought back to Mosul. The plan to dismantle the railway in the Jarablus area through the Jarablus Detachment was abandoned, and the 6th Depot Regiment between Mosul and Derbesiye was left in place of the Sinjar Detachment. While the Army Commander Ali İhsan Pasha issued warning orders to his own units to observe the armistice, he also looked for ways to negotiate with the British and agree on a protocol. At that time the units of the 6th Army stood on the line Raqqa - Deir ez-Zor - Mayadin - Sinjar - Tel Afer - Hamamalil - Great Zab crossing - Guwair bridge - Dibeke - Kadıhane - Taktak - Chamchamal - Sulaymaniyah - Halabja. The British forces facing the 6th Army were on the line Ana - Elhaza - Qayyarah wells - Altınköprü - Kirkuk - Tuz Khurmatu - Salahiye - Khanaqin.

Following the armistice, Ali İhsan Pasha proposed to General Marshall in a letter that, in order to end hostilities, both sides should remain where they were until peace and that the land between them should be regarded as a neutral zone. In reply, Marshall stated that under Article 7 of the armistice he had the right to occupy any strategic points he deemed necessary, and that under Article 16 the Turkish units in Iraq had to surrender. Ali İhsan Pasha then declared that, since there was no situation threatening the security of the Allies, Article 7 could not be applied; that the Iraqi border should be settled through diplomacy, not through fighting; and that the proposal to surrender his units could not be accepted.

On 1 November 1918 the British, claiming that the local population was being mistreated, advanced from Qayyarah to Hamamalil, 20 km from Mosul. After a protest, General Cassel, commander of the British forward troops in Iraq, halted the operation. Cassel said that he had started the advance because he had not known about the armistice, and that he would not leave Hamamalil. He added that on 2 November he had received orders to occupy Mosul, and asked Ali İhsan Pasha to pull the Turkish units back five miles and to leave a Turkish guard unit in Mosul to keep order. Ali İhsan Pasha told Lieutenant Colonel Listman, who had brought the letter, that he did not know whether the armistice contained any provision for the occupation of Mosul; that, to avoid any disorder, he could withdraw his troops two kilometres south of Mosul, while the British should stay a further five kilometres away from the Turkish troops; and that if an order came for the evacuation of Mosul, the evacuation could then be discussed in a friendly way. He then reported the situation to Istanbul.

Despite all these well-meant wishes and gestures, on 3 November 1918 the British continued their advance by taking the eastern end of the Mosul bridge and the northern and western exits of the city. General Cassel settled in the German consulate building in Mosul and demanded that the Turkish troops east of the Tigris and in Mosul stay where they were. These demands of the British general had to be accepted, and so from 3 November 1918 Turkish and British troops were present together in the city of Mosul. On the same day General Cabel, who brought a letter written by General Marshall in Baghdad, repeated what General Cassel had said and raised the question of surrender. Ali İhsan Pasha hardened his stance and made the gravity of the matter clear: "I categorically refuse the question of surrender. I would kill myself before I surrendered my troops to you."

Having entered Mosul in November, the British from then on allowed no Turkish unit or transport convoy to leave the city, and claimed that Christians in and around Mosul were being attacked, declaring that they would occupy Mosul if these attacks continued. At the same time General Fanshawe, relying on inspections made by a British officer in Nusaybin, Demirkapı and Nimetli to see on the spot the condition of British prisoners in the 6th Army's area, wrote in a report to the Army that the British prisoners held by the Turkish army had not been well cared for, and said that the terms of peace and the treatment of the Turkish prisoners in British hands would depend on the attitude of the Turkish side. These claims were in fact nothing more than pretexts sought for the occupation of Mosul.

In November 1918 long discussions were held at the British headquarters with the participation of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in Iraq General Marshall, the commander of the British 1st Corps General Kop, the commander of the 18th Division General Fanshawe, the Political Officer for Iraq Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, and the commander of the 6th Army Ali İhsan Pasha. General Fanshawe said that since his order to occupy Mosul was clear he was obliged to carry it out; that if it was not obeyed he would enter Mosul by force; that in that case the 6th Army would have broken the armistice; and that he would then be free in all his operations and actions. Ali İhsan Pasha reported the situation to Istanbul. On the evening of the same day General Marshall sent Ali İhsan Pasha another letter containing very harsh terms. After reading it, Ali İhsan Pasha said that he had submitted his resignation to the Ottoman Ministry of War; that until a successor was appointed the Army chief of staff would take part in the negotiations with the British; and that the most senior officer, the commander of the 2nd Division, would act in his place. In response, Marshall demanded that Ali İhsan Pasha leave Mosul on 8 November 1918, otherwise he would apply Article 16 of the armistice.

While waiting for orders from general headquarters for the evacuation, Ali İhsan Pasha gave the necessary order for the joint decision to be carried out under protest. The Army, however, hoped not to have to evacuate Mosul before 15 November 1918, thanks to diplomatic initiatives. On 8 November, when the joint decision was to take effect, the British began acts of aggression in order to put the 6th Army in a difficult position and speed up its withdrawal. On the same day a British unit lowered the Turkish flag at the government house and raised the British flag in its place, and all the Ottoman flags in the city were also lowered. The aircraft, the wireless telegraph station and the ammunition depots in Mosul were seized. In the end, under all this pressure, the evacuation of Mosul began, and an infantry battalion, two batteries and part of the heavy equipment set out from Mosul towards Nusaybin.

Ali İhsan Pasha left Mosul for Nusaybin on 9 November, leaving Dadaylı Halit Bey and the commander of the 2nd Division Aşir Bey in Mosul until 15 November. On the same day the order to evacuate Mosul was received from Istanbul, and Major Halit (Akmansu) went to the British headquarters to announce that they had received the order to evacuate Mosul and that the evacuation would continue as agreed with General Marshall. By noon on 15 November 1918 the Ottoman troops had left Mosul. The troops in Sulaymaniyah and Rawanduz were allowed to move to Anatolia after this date. In the evacuation of many districts of the province of Mosul, the British did not observe the terms agreed between the two sides; seeking to seize the weapons and food in the depots and to occupy the province as soon as possible, they tried to drive out the Turkish units there and occupied depots such as Simele, Zakho, Tel Afer, Hokne and Üveynat.

Under the last agreement made between Aşir Bey and the British, it was decided that the evacuation would continue until 30 November 1918. Meanwhile the British removed all Turkish officials in the province of Mosul from their posts and sent them outside the provincial borders. Soldiers from the populations of Mosul and Baghdad who had not yet been discharged were discharged, and lists of their names were handed to the British on request. In November 1918 a man named Sheikh Mahmud set up, under British protection, a "Kurdish Rule" whose sphere of influence included Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu, Kifri, Zakho, Bana, Rawanduz, Duhok, Nebi Yunus, Erbil, Altınköprü and Sina, places where the great majority of the population was Turkish. The British even banned speaking Turkish in this region. At the end of the World War the Ottoman State, an ally of Germany, was declared defeated, and a large part of the remaining Anatolian lands was also occupied. Finally, on 16 March 1920, soldiers of the imperialist powers landed in Istanbul and the capital was occupied. After the occupation of Istanbul the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved and some of its members were arrested by British soldiers and sent into exile. The deputies who managed to escape crossed to Anatolia and, together with deputies arriving from all parts of the country, formed the Grand National Assembly in Ankara on 23 April 1920, taking on the organisation and leadership of the National Struggle under Mustafa Kemal.