The Pitched Battle of Manzikert
Alp Arslan talked with Diogenes at length. As stated in our sources, the sultan criticized the emperor's rejection of peace negotiations, enumerated the military mistakes of the Byzantine army, and finally asked him what treatment he expected: upon Diogenes' reply that he would either be killed, or be paraded in chains through the lands of Islam, or, as a very slight possibility, be pardoned and sent back to his country as a vassal, the sultan announced that he would establish friendship with him, consoled him, and seated him beside himself on the throne. Thus the Turkish sultan gave yet another example of compassion, moderation and humanity. Alp Arslan, having hosted Diogenes, with whom he concluded a treaty of alliance, like a sovereign in a private tent for about a week, sent him back to his country together with his retinue and the other captive nobles, under the escort of a Turkish cavalry unit (3 September 1071). According to some of the articles of the treaty, whose text has not survived, encountered in the sources, the emperor was to pay one and a half million gold pieces as ransom, to pay in addition 360,000 gold pieces every year, to release all the Muslim captives present within the Byzantine Empire, and to send military forces to the sultan when needed. As for the territorial question, the sultan demanded the cession to the Seljuks of Manzikert, Urfa (Edessa), Manbij and Antioch together with their surroundings; Diogenes, who accepted the proposals, pointed out that the transfer of territory would be possible only if he retained the crown. Before Alp Arslan set out eastward against the Karakhanids, Diogenes, on entering Byzantine territory, learned that Michael, the son of Constantine Doukas, had been proclaimed emperor in Constantinople, and, as is well known, Diogenes, stripped of his imperial powers, was defeated by Michael's armies at Sivas and at Adana, was captured, had his eyes gouged out, and died in agony in the monastery in which he was confined; thus the implementation of the treaty became difficult.
The killing of his ally compelled Alp Arslan to realize the provisions of the treaty by arms, and he rightly ordered the sons of Kutalmış and the Turkmen beys to conquer Anatolia. The accusation of the contemporary Byzantine historian Bryennios that the Turks broke the peace is not correct. As the historians of that period such as Aristakes, Matthew and Zonaras point out, the sole party responsible for the renewal of the war could only be Byzantium, which wished to forget Diogenes and everything connected with him and ignored the truth. For under the conditions we have described from the beginning, a ruler like Alp Arslan could not be expected to renounce his territorial demand after the pitched battle fought for Anatolia.
If recourse to force became necessary to keep in effect a treaty that was the right of the sword, this must be regarded as the most natural action the victorious side would resort to. In this connection it is appropriate to note that it is not right to attach much value, in the face of the true religious and military character of the Great Seljuk Empire and the importance Anatolia held in the eyes of that state, to the claims put forward by some Western researchers, such as the story that Alp Arslan left the raiders to their own devices and was not concerned with Byzantium, that the idea of the existence, alongside the caliphate, of the Byzantine Empire as a political entity actually lived in the mentality of the Eastern world at that time, and that even after the conquest of Anatolia Sultan Malikshah was ready to cede all of Anatolia to Byzantium in order to establish friendship with the Emperor Alexios, and so on.
