The Pitched Battle of Manzikert
Before the blow, Alp Arslan made a last offer of peace. But the emperor, who did not receive well the delegation he had sent under the leadership of the kadi Ibn al-Muhallaban and the commander Sav-tigin, interpreted the sultan's wish for an agreement as an avoidance of battle, said that negotiations could begin only in the Seljuk capital Rey, and even declared that he intended to winter in Isfahan and send his animals to Hamadan. As a warrior of Islam, it was natural for the sultan to make an offer of peace. However, the refusal he received helped to increase the determination to fight in the army. The sultan, who had postponed the hour of the clash until the time of the Friday prayer, after the prayer performed in congregation, dressed in white, declared in his address to the soldiers, after making his testament that if he fell a martyr he should be buried where he was struck down, and that the officials of the administration and the commanders should follow his son, the heir apparent Malikshah, that he would fight for the state and the faith not as a ruler but as a common soldier, and that those who did not wish to fight were free to withdraw and leave; to show that he was no different from any soldier in the army, he tied his horse's tail with his own hand, and, in order to make clear that he would fight in the front ranks, he laid aside his bow and arrows and took up his sword and mace. Meanwhile, religious ceremonies were also being held in the Byzantine camp, hymns were being sung, and noblemen and army priests moving among the ranks with coloured banners and large crosses in their hands were striving to encourage the soldiers.
Shortly after noon both sides had taken up battle order. The emperor was in the centre; he had placed Alyates of Cappadocia at the head of the Anatolian units on his left wing, and the Rumelian troops under the command of Nikephoros Bryennios on his right wing, and he had left Andronikos, the son of the Caesar Ioannes, in the rear at the head of the reserve forces. Alp Arslan, for his part, divided his army into four parts. He placed the two more numerous of these in ambush on the hills at the sides of the battlefield, positioned the third part, which he charged with holding the enemy's rear, in suitable places, and took up his own position opposite Diogenes. First the Turkish centre forces went on the attack under the cover of the archers. Diogenes, eager to crush this small force at once, launched a counter-attack with his whole army and pursued the Turks, who began to withdraw.
The feigned retreat (the Turan tactic), skilfully applied by Alp Arslan, succeeded, and the emperor, having moved quite far from his camp, arrived toward evening right at the place where the ambushes lay. When the order for a general attack was given to the Turkish army, the emperor, realizing his mistake, tried to withdraw, but the Byzantine army was surrounded from the front, from the flanks, and from the rear by cavalry descending in the direction of the enemy camp, and was taken into an encirclement. Andronikos, the commander of the reserve forces, presenting the emperor's futile attempt to withdraw to those around him as a rout, attempted to flee, and this also caused the Armenian units to move away. By the time darkness fell, the Byzantine army had been annihilated within the ever-tightening ring. Diogenes, captured wounded, was brought before the sultan together with his captured staff.
From a purely tactical point of view, the causes of the Byzantine defeat were undoubtedly not only the Uz and Pechenegs' joining the sultan (Attaleiates, Matthew), or the flight of the Armenians (Michael the Syrian), or the abandonment of the battlefield by Andronikos, who disliked the emperor (Bryennios, Zonaras). Although the incompetence shown by Diogenes in directing the battle (Psellos) may be mentioned as one of the factors, it is more correct to seek the main cause in the steppe method of warfare, based on the feigned retreat, the ambush and combat at a distance, applied by Alp Arslan with careful command and control, and in the high morale of the Turkish army.
