Turkishness and Tatarness: The Ottoman State and the Crimean Khanate

In later times the Girays always made great efforts to obtain the Great (Ulug) Khanate. This brought them face to face with Moscow. Ivan IV, seizing the opportunity of Sahib Giray's murder, took Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan two years later, and took the place of the Great Khans in the Volga basin. Thus the Muscovite Empire was established in Eastern Europe. The Ottomans, who opposed Sahib Giray's policy of expansion, did not support him in this direction. On the other hand, however, the main force that prevented the Crimean Khanate from falling under Moscow's rule like the Kazan Khanate was the Ottoman State. The Crimean Khanate was able to maintain its existence for another 300 years thanks to Ottoman protection. On the other hand, the Crimean Khanate's subordination to the Ottoman State yielded extremely important results for Istanbul. The Ottoman State's resistance to Russian ambitions in the Black Sea, and the Black Sea's remaining an Ottoman lake for 400 years, were due chiefly to the Crimean Khanate. The Russian Tsar reached the Black Sea by taking the fortress of Azov in 1696, and only in 1783 was he able to bring Crimea and the northern regions of the Black Sea completely under his rule. Because of this long resistance, the Crimean Khanate was remembered with gratitude by the Ottomans. Evliya Çelebi, in the 1670s, refers to the Crimean Khanate as a "Sedd-i Sedid" (a mighty rampart) against the Russian invasion.

The common destiny of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire did not stop there either. The Crimean forces assumed a vital role for the Ottomans in Europe and in Iran, playing the role of a raiding (akıncı) and vanguard (pişdar) army. In order to draw the Crimean forces to these fronts, the Ottoman Government was obliged to make certain sacrifices, among them sending considerable sums of money to be distributed to the Crimean army. However, the Crimean tribal aristocracy from time to time showed resistance to taking part in these distant campaigns, because when the Crimean forces went off to these distant lands, the Crimean homeland remained exposed to Cossack and Russian attacks. The occasional revolts of the Crimean mirzas arose for this reason.

In this context it is necessary to shed light on the true face of the Second Vienna campaign of 1683 and of the events that took place in the years that followed. We shall take up a matter which today is reflected even in the school textbooks of our country and which has given rise to a wrong and unjust view of the Crimeans. According to the claim, Murad Giray Khan, who joined the Ottoman Army in the Vienna campaign of 1683, had undertaken the task of stopping the German-Austrian army on the river beyond Vienna. It has been claimed that he withdrew in the face of this army and thereby caused the rout at Vienna. In the light of the information provided by the Silahdar History and the history of Mehmed Giray, the truth is different. The Khan, seeing that he could do nothing against the large German army equipped with very powerful firearms, asked Kara Mustafa for urgent help, and the commander-in-chief Kara Mustafa Pasha, in his tent before Vienna, rejected this request with insulting words. Kara Mustafa had a proud personality, accepting the opinion of none of the other commanders and insulting them. In short, there was no harmony in the command staff. This was generally one of the main causes of the rout. In order to put the blame for the rout on someone else, Kara Mustafa had the aged pasha of Buda executed and Murad Giray deposed. Unfortunately, his claim has been repeated as if it were the truth to this day.

After the rout, in the years 1683–1693, the Crimean Khanate, especially under the rule of Hacı Selim Giray Khan, entered into a complete union of destiny with the Ottomans. With the victory of Kaçanik in 1688, Selim Giray Khan would be congratulated by the padishah as the savior of Ottoman Rumelia and of the empire, and the sultan would thereafter order the grand viziers on campaign to act in accordance with his opinion. Hacı Selim Giray, ascending the throne of the Khanate four times up to 1704, became the true savior of the Empire in an atmosphere of anarchy during these dangerous years of war. The imperial letters (name-i hümayun) in the Ottoman archives clearly express this fact. In these wars, which lasted 16 years, the northern front against Russia and Poland was protected entirely thanks to the successful resistance of the Crimean army, and these forces repulsed every time the armies of Tsar Peter that came to invade Crimea and the Polish forces trying to invade Moldavia.

Nevertheless, because the Crimeans could not obtain the necessary help they insistently requested from Istanbul, the fortress of Azov fell into Russian hands in 1696, and in this way Russia set foot on the Black Sea for the first time and Istanbul came under threat. The Crimean Khanate was in any case a shield for Turkey against the north for centuries. Stalin's terrible deportation order of 1944 was an act intended precisely to eliminate this rampart completely.