Chechnya's Declaration of Independence and the Russian-Chechen War
Before long the Chechens' second major guerrilla action took place. On 9 January 1996 the Chechen resistance group called "Lone Wolf", led by Dudayev's son-in-law Salman Raduyev, raided the Dagestani town of Kizlyar and took 2 thousand people hostage in the city hospital. The fighters released most of the hostages and set off for Chechnya, taking 150 of them along. However, the Chechen fighters were stopped by Russian military units in the village of Pervomayskoye in the south of Dagestan (10 January 1996). On 11 January the Russians surrounded the village. The Chechen fighters twice rejected the Russian offer for the release of the hostages. Thereupon the Russians began to bomb the village. During this Russian bombardment, which lasted three days without interruption, Salman Raduyev and his comrades broke through the Russian encirclement, escaped from the village of Pervomayskoye and returned to Chechnya. Meanwhile, on 16 January 1996, 9 people of North Caucasian origin, reported to be pro-Chechen, raided the ferry Avrasya, which was preparing to sail from the Turkish port of Trabzon to the Russian port of Sochi, and took its passengers hostage. Their aim was to draw the attention of the whole world to the events taking place in Chechnya, and they succeeded in this. In the end they concluded their action on 19 January 1996 in Istanbul, where they had arrived on the said ferry.
The repercussions of Salman Raduyev's Kizlyar raid were quite great. So much so that, as the Russian opposition parties also pointed out, this raid was interpreted as the first sign that Russia was beginning to lose the initiative on the Chechen problem. For example, the chairman of the reformist Yabloko Party, Grigory Yavlinsky, stated that Russian President Boris Yeltsin "was sinking ever deeper in Chechnya" and that the war in Chechnya was "Yeltsin's Vietnam", and said that Yeltsin would try to get rid of the Chechen issue before the June 1996 elections. Indeed, when we look at the events that unfolded up to December 1996, it could be seen that Yavlinsky had made accurate predictions. Indeed, in the time that passed, Yeltsin wanted to settle the Chechen issue, even if largely for the sake of "election advertising", and for this purpose he held talks with Chechen officials. However, it was not possible to say that Yeltsin was sincere in these peace talks.
Whatever the reason, 1996 was a year of intense traffic of negotiations towards the solution of the Chechen issue. This could be followed from March 1996 onwards. For instance, the formation, by a decision of the Russian government on 2 March 1996, of an action group for the implementation of the government plan concerning the solution of the Chechen issue was noteworthy. On the one hand, this group was tasked with submitting by 28 March 1996 to the Commission on the Chechen Question a report on the information services to be provided to the military units taking part in the solution of the Chechen issue; on the other hand, it was concerned with informing the democratic movements in the Russian presidential elections to be held on 16 June 1996. Frankly, the task of this group was not information but disinformation.
